

CURRICULUM VITAE

Jesse J. Prinz

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Philosophy Program
City University of New York, Graduate Center
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Education

The University of Chicago, 1997, Ph.D. with honors in Philosophy. Dissertation: “Perceptual Cognition: A Study in the Semantics of Thought.”

New York University, 1992, B.A. *summa cum laude* with honors in Philosophy. Senior Thesis: “A Logic of Vagueness” (awarded best in Arts & Sciences).

Professional Experience

Einstein Fellow, School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt University, Berlin. 2015-2017.
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, City University of New York, Graduate Center, 2009-present.

Director, Interdisciplinary Committee for Science Studies, City University of New York, Graduate Center, 2010-present.

Director of the Philosophy Lab, City University of New York, Graduate Center (2013- present)

Visiting Professor, New York University, Spring, 2013.

Instructor of 2007 and 2008 DuPont Summer Seminar on “Human Nature: Ethical Implications of Biological, Cultural, and Technological Transformation” at the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, NC.

John J. Rogers Distinguished Term Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, July 2007-2008.

Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Spring 2003-2007.

Visiting Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, 2005-6.

Visiting Fellow, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France May-June 2005. Visiting Fellow, Collegium Budapest, Hungary, June 2003.

Research Fellow, School for Advanced Study, University of London, England Spring-Summer 2002.

Visiting Assistant Professor, Division of the Humanities, California Institute of Technology, Fall 2001.

Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, Spring 1997.

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, Fall 1997-2002.

Awards and Honors

Templeton Grant, 2015-17: Principle Investigator “The Moral Self”

Stainton Prize for Notable Achievement in Cognitive Science, 2003 Society for Philosophy and Psychology.

Tanner Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching (one of UNC’s top teaching awards), 2007.

Publications

1. Books and Chapters

A. Authored Books

The Moral Self. New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Works of Wonder: The Experience, Evaluation, and Origin of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

The Conscious Brain. New York: Oxford University Press (2012).

Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape Our Lives. London: Penguin; New York: Norton (2012).

The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007).

Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press

(2004). (Awarded: A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2005)

Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2002).

B. Edited Volumes

Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology, (forthcoming) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mind and Cognition, Third Edition, with William Lycan (2008) Oxford: Blackwell.

C. Articles and Chapters

“Impure Aesthetics,” (with A. Seidel). In F. Cova & S. Réhault, *Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics*. Bloomsbury (forthcoming).

“Wonder, Appreciation, and the Value of Art,” (with J. Fingerhut). *Progress in Brain Research*, 237 (forthcoming).

“Grounding Evaluative Concepts,” (with J. Fingerhut). *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B* (forthcoming).

“Empathy and the Moral Self,” In S. Silva (ed.) *Morality and Emotion: New Interdisciplinary Landscapes*. Routledge (forthcoming).

“Reactive Spontaneity: William James on Attention,” in A. Klein (ed.) *Handbook of William James* (forthcoming).

“Is Consciousness a Trick or Treat?” in B. Huebner (ed.) *Engaging Daniel Dennett*, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

“Moral Sedimentation,” in G. Caruso (ed.), *Neuroexistentialism*, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

“The History of Moral Norms,” in K. Gray and J. Graham (eds), *Atlas of Moral Psychology*, Guilford (2018).

“Against Outsider Art,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* (2017).

“Attention, Working Memory, and Animal Consciousness,” in K. Andrews (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Animal Minds* (2017).

“Love as a Syndrome,” (with A. Pismenny) in C. Grau and A. Smuts (eds.) *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Love*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

“Neo-Classical Sentimentalism,” in R. Debes & K. Steuber (eds.), *Ethical*

Sentimentalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2017).

“Embodied Context-Sensitivity and Discrete Emotions: A Response to Moors,” (with G. Eickers and J. Loaiza). *Psychological Inquiry* (2017).

“An Enactive Theory of Emotions” (with D. Shargel) in Naar, H. & Teroni, F. (eds), *The Ontology of Emotions*, Cambridge University Press (2017).

“Great Works: A reciprocal relationship between spatial magnitudes and aesthetic judgment” (with A. Seidel). *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts* (2017).

“Unconscious Vision and the Function of Consciousness,” in Z. Radman (ed.), *Before Consciousness* (forthcoming). *Before Consciousness: In Search of the Fundamentals of Mind*. Exeter: Imprint Academic (2017).

“Against Illusionism,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 23, 186-196 (2016).

“Diachronic Identity and the Moral Self,” (with S. Nichols) in J. Kiverstein (ed.), *Handbook of the Social Mind*. Routledge (2016).

“Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche’s Method Compared,” *Nietzsche Studies*, 47, 180-201 (2016).

“What is the Affective Component of Pain?” in D. Bain, M. Brady, and J. Corns (eds.), *The Nature of Pain*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016).

“Emotions, morality, and identity,” in S. Silva (ed.), *Morality and emotion*, New York: Routledge. (2016)

“Hume and Cognitive Science,” in P. Russell (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook to David Hume*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).

“Sentimentalism and the Moral Brain,” in S.M. Liao (ed.), *The Significance of Neuroscience for Morality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).

“Currin and Pornography,” in D. Freeman and D. Matrevers (eds.), *Figuring Our Figurative Art: Contemporary Philosophers on Contemporary Paintings*. Acumen (2015).

“Naturalizing Metaethics,” *Mind* (2015)

“Unconscious Perception,” in M. Matthan, *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).

“Neuroscientific Lessons for Moral Philosophy,” in J. Decety and T. Wheatley (Eds.), *The Moral Brain: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2015).

“Poetic Opacity” (with E. Mandelbaum) in J. Gibson (ed.), *Philosophy of Poetry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2014).

“The Aesthetics of Punk Rock,” *Philosophy Compass* (2014).

“Seeing with Feeling,” in G. Currie, A. Meskin, M. Kieran, and J. Robson (Eds.), *Aesthetics and the Sciences of the Mind* (2014).

“An Empirical Case for Motivational Internalism,” in G. Björnsson (ed.), *Motivational Internalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2014).

“Attention, Atomism, and the Disunity of Consciousness,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2013).

“Can Porn Be Art?” (with P. von Bradbandt) in H. Maes and J. Levenson (eds.) *Art and Pornography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013).

“The Poverty of Experience: Reducing Siegel’s Phenomenology,” *Philosophical Studies* (2013).

“The Hand Manifesto,” in Z. Radman (ed.), *The Hand: An Organ of the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2013).

“Sound Morality: Irritating and Icky Noises Amplify Divergent Moral Domains” (with A. Seidel) *Cognition*, 127: 1-5. (2013).

“Mad and Glad: Musically Induced Emotions Have Divergent Moral Impact,” (with A. Seidel) *Motivation and Emotion*, 37: 269-237 (2013).

“Alligator or Squirrel: Musically Induced Fear Reveals Threat in Ambiguous Figures,” (with A. Seidel) *Perception*, 41, 1535-1539 (2013).

“Constructive Sentimentalism: Legal and Political Implications” *NOMOS* (2012).

“Regaining Composure,” in M. Werning and E. Machery (eds.), *Handbook of Compositionality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012).

“The Singularity and Inevitable Doom,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* (2012).

“Stirring Images: Fear not Happiness or Arousal Makes Art More Sublime,” (with K. Eskine and N. Kacinik) *Emotion* (2012).

“Sensational Judgmentalism: Reconciling Solomon and James,” K. Higgins and D. Sherman (eds.), *Passion, Death, and Spirituality*, pp. 3-14. Dordrecht: Springer (2012)

“Emotions: How Many Are There?” E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (Eds.),

Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, pp. 183-200 (2012).

“Where Do Morals Come From?” in M. Christen (ed.). *Philosophical Implications of Empirically Informed Ethics* (2011).

“A Bad Taste in the Mouth: Gustatory Disgust Influences Moral Judgment,” (with K. Eskine and N. Kacinik). *Psychological Science*, 22, 295- 299 (2011).

“Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” in P. Goldie and A. Coplan (Eds.), *Perspectives on Empathy* (2011).

“The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology,” in T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds.) *Cognitive Phenomenology*, Oxford University Press (2011).

“Sentimentalism and Self-Directed Emotions” in A. K. Ziv, K. Lehrer, and H. B. Schmid and (eds.), *Self Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality*. Springer (2011).

“Wittgenstein and the Neuroscience of the Self,” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 48, 147-160 (2011).

“Is Attention Necessary or Sufficient for Consciousness?” in C. Mole, D. Smithies, and W. Wu (eds.) *Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays*. Oxford (2011).

“Against Empathy,” *Southern Journal of Philosophy* (2011).

“Emotional and Aesthetic Value,” in E. Shellekens and P. Goldie (eds.), *The Aesthetic Mind* (pp. 71-88). Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011).

“Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response,” *Philosophy Now*, 82, 8-11 (2011).

“When is Film Art,” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 64, 473-486 (2011).

“Waiting for the Self,” in J. Liu (ed.) *Consciousness and the Self: New Essays*. Cambridge University Press (2011).

“What Makes Something Fashionable?” (with Anya Farennikova) in J. Kennett and J. Wolfendale (eds.) *Philosophy of Fashion*, Wiley-Blackwell (2011).

“When Does Perception Become Conscious?” in B. Nanay (ed.) *Perceiving the World: New Essays on Perception*. Oxford (2010).

“Moral Emotions” (with Shaun Nichols) in J. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (Eds.), *The Moral Psychology Handbook*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010).

“For Valence,” *Emotion Review*, 2, 5-13 (2010).

“Ethics and Psychology,” in J. Skorupski (Ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Ethics*, New York: Routledge (2010).

“Attention and Consciousness” (with Felipe de Brigard) *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science*, 1, 51-59 (2010).

“The Moral Emotions” in P. Goldie (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).

“Reviving Whorf: The Return of Linguistic Relativity” (with Francisca Reines) *Philosophy Compass*, 4, 1022-1032 (2009).

“The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics,” *Journal of Ethics*, (2009).

“Against Moral Nativism,” in M. Bishop and D. Murphy (Eds.) *Stich and His Critics*, Blackwell (2009).

“What Thoughts Are Made Of,” (with Lera Boroditsky) in G. R. Semin and E. R. Smith (Eds.), *Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2008).

“Is Consciousness Embodied?” in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (Eds.), *Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2008).

“Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy,” in J. Knobe and S. Nichols (Eds.), *Experimental Philosophy*, Oxford University Press (2008).

“Intuitions about Consciousness: Experimental Studies.” (with J. Knobe) *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 7 (1). (2008).

“Mental Pointing: Phenomenal Knowledge Without Concepts,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 14, (2007).

“Is Emotion a Form of Perception?” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume 32, 137-160 (2007).

“Can Moral Obligations Be Empirically Discovered?” in H. Wettstein et al. (Eds.), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, XXXI, (2007).

“All Consciousness Is Perceptual,” (A Debate with Christopher Peacocke) in J. Cohen and B. McLaughlin (Eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind* (pp. 335-357), Blackwell (2007).

“Is Morality Innate?” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), *Moral Psychology, vol. 1: Evolution of Morals*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2007).

“The Intermediate-Level Theory of Consciousness,” in S. Schneider and M. Velmans (Eds.) *Blackwell Companion to Consciousness*. Oxford: Blackwell (2007).

“The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments,” *Philosophical Explorations*, 9, 29–43 (2006).

“Really Bad Taste,” in D. Lopes and M. Kieran (Eds.) *Knowing Art*. New York, NY: Springer (2006).

“Is the Mind Really Modular?” in R. Stainton (Ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*. Oxford: Blackwell (22-36) (2006).

“Beyond Appearances: The Content of Perception and Sensation,” in T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (Eds.) *Perceptual Experience* (pp. 434-459). Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006).

“Are Emotions Feelings?” *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 12, 9-25 (2005).

“A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness,” in A. Brook and K. Akins (Eds.) *Cognition and the Brain: Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement* (pp. 381-396). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005).

“Churchland’s Semantic Holism,” in B. Keeley (Ed.), *Contemporary Thinkers in Focus: Paul Churchland*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005).

“Emotions, Embodiment, and Awareness,” in L. Feldman-Barrett, P. Niedenthal, and P. Winkielman (Eds.) *Emotion and Consciousness*. New York, NY: Guilford (2005).

“Passionate Thoughts,” in R. Zwaan and D. Pecher (Eds.), *The Grounding of Cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, and thinking*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005).

“The Return of Concept Empiricism,” In H. Cohen and C. Lefebvre (Eds.) *Categorization and Cognitive Science*, Elsevier (2005).

“Imitation and Moral Development,” in S. Hurley and N. Chater (Eds.), *Perspectives on Imitation: From Mirror Neurons to Memes*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2005).

“Putting Concepts to Work” (with Andy Clark) *Mind and Language*, 19, 57-69 (2004).

“The Fractionation of Introspection,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 11 (7-8), 40-57 (2004).

“Searching for a Scientific Experience,” (with Anthony Jack) *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 11 (1), 51-56 (2004).

“Which Emotions Are Basic?” in D. Evans and P. Cruse (Eds.), *Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality* (69-88), Oxford University Press (2004).

“Embodied Emotions” In R. C. Solomon and L. C. Harlan (Eds.), *Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion*, Oxford University Press (2004).

“Level-Headed Mysterianism and Artificial Experience,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 10 (4-5), 111-132 (2003).

“Emotion, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals,” in A. Hatzimoysis (Ed.), *Philosophy and the Emotions*, Cambridge University Press (2003).

“Consciousness, Computation, and Emotion,” In S. C. Moore and M. Oaksford (Eds.), *Emotional Cognition: From Brain to Behaviour*. John Benjamins Publishing Company (2003).

“Acquisition and Productivity in Perceptual Symbol Systems,” (with L. W. Barsalou) In T. Dartnall (Ed.), *Creativity, Cognition and Knowledge*. Westport, CT: Praeger, (2002).

“Functionalism, Dualism and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness,” in W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. Stufflebeam (Eds.), *Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell (2001).

“Steering a Course for Embodied Representations,” (with L. W. Barsalou) in A. Markman and E. Dietrich, eds., *Cognitive Dynamics*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Press, (2000).

“The Ins and Outs of Consciousness,” *Brain and Mind*, 2, (2000).

“A Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness.” *Consciousness and Cognition*, 9, 243-259, (2000).

“The Duality of Content.” *Philosophical Studies*, 100, 1-34, (2000).

“Vagueness, Language, and Ontology,” *The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, (1999).

“Mundane Creativity in Perceptual Symbol Systems,” (with L. W. Barsalou) in T. B. Ward, S. M. Smith and J. Vaid, eds., *Conceptual Structures and Processes: Emergence, Discovery and Change*, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, (1997).

D. Responses to Critics

“Précis of *The Emotional Construction of Morals*” and “The Significance of Moral

Variation: Replies to Tiberius, Gert and Doris” *Analysis*, 69, 701-704; 731-745 (2009).

“Précis of *Gut Reactions*” and “Response to D’Arms and Hills, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 76, 707-711; 729-732 (2008).

“A Reply to Lormand,” *Consciousness and Cognition*, 9 (2000). “A Reply to Marcel,” *Consciousness and Cognition*, 9 (2000). “Author’s Response,” *Metascience*, 12, 297-303 (2003).

“Sensible Ideas: A Reply to Sarnecki and Markman and Stilwell,” *Philosophical Psychology*, 17, 419-430 (2004).

E. Encyclopedia Articles

“The Philosophy of Emotions” (with D. Shargel) in L. Feldman-Barrett, *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th Edition. Guilford Press (forthcoming).

“Culture and Cognitive Science,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2011).

“Emotion and Moral Judgment,” in H. Pashler (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Mind*, SAGE (2011).

“Emotions: Motivating Feelings” in B. McLaughlin (ed.) *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford University Press (2009).

“Emotions,” in K. Frankish and W. Ramsey (eds.), *Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science*. Cambridge University Press (2008).

“Emotion,” in P. Thagard (ed.) *The Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science*, Elsevier (2006).

“Empiricism,” in R. Stainton (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, Elsevier (2006).

“Concepts,” *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Second Edition, Macmillan (2005).

“Concepts, Philosophical Issues Concerning,” in L. Nadel (Ed.) *The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science*, Macmillan (2003).

F. Book Reviews and Commentaries

“A response to Paul Bloom Against Empathy,” *Boston Review*, (September/October 2014).

“Can Concept Empiricism Forestall Eliminativism? A Commentary on Machery”

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2010).

“Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah *Experiments in Ethics*” (with John Doris) *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (2009).

“Accessed, Accessible, and Inaccessible: Where to Draw the Phenomenal Line,” a commentary on Ned Block, *Behavioral and Brain Science* (2008).

“Resisting the Linguistic Analogy: A Commentary on Hauser, Young, and Cushman,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), *Moral Psychology, vol. 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2007).

“How to Make Morals: A commentary on Richard Joyce’s *The Evolution of Morality*,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2007).

“Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception,” (a critical commentary on Noë Action in Perception) *Psyche*, 12, <http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/noe/Prinz.pdf> (2006).

“A Review of Wollheim’s *On the Emotions*,” *Ethics*, 113: 188-191 (2002).

“A Review of Antonio Damasio’s *The Feeling of What Happens*,” *The Chicago Tribune*, January 23 (2000).

“A Review of Stephen Pinker’s *Words and Rules*,” *The Chicago Tribune*, November 21 (1999).

G. Contributions to Introductory and Popular Volumes

“Mind and Body” section of D. Papineau (ed.) *Philosophy: Essential Tools for Critical Thought*. Duncan Baird Publishes, London (2004).

“Philosophy of Mind” section of Stephen Cahn (ed.) *Philosophy for the 21st Century* Oxford University Press (2003).

Lectures

A. Book Symposia

“Beyond Human Nature,” Book Symposium on *Gut Reactions*. American Philosophical Association, Central Division, New Orleans, February 2013.

“Defending Sentimental Morals” Book Symposium on *The Emotional Construction of Morals*. American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Francisco, April

2011.

“Embodied Emotions,” Book Symposium on *Gut Reactions*. American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, April 2004.

“Defending Empiricism,” Book Symposium on *Furnishing the Mind*. American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Washington D.C., 2003.

B. Conferences Focused on Philosophy of Prinz

Workshop on Prinz, University of Stuttgart, June 2014.

Conference on Prinz, Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analytica, San Sebastian, Spain, September 2012.

Workshop on Prinz, Unisinos University, Porto Alegre, Brazil, May 2012.

Conference on Prinz research and “William James Lecture,” Universität Osnabrueck, Germany, April 2009.

Conference on Prinz research and three lectures delivered (on concepts, consciousness, and morality). University of Buenos Aires, August 2008.

Conference on Prinz research and four lectures delivered (on morality and the brain). University of Tokyo, Komaba Campus, July 2008.

Conference on Prinz research and two lectures delivered (“Was William James Right About Emotions?” “Was John Locke Right About Concepts?”). Vereniging voor Analytische Filosofie, Antwerp, Belgium, March 2007.

C. Talks (Omitted for brevity)